The virtual seminar will be held from 12:30 to 2:00 PM (US E.T.)
ICBM advocates claim they are necessary for deterrence. This claim rests primarily on three arguments. First, ICBMs are a hedge against the failure of other parts of the triad. Second, ICBMs limit damage to the United States because they are a “sponge” that would soak up over half of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Silo hardness, plus ICBM prompt launch capabilities, give Russia a strong incentive to concentrate on attacking U.S. silos, thus leaving them with fewer nuclear weapons for other targets in the United States. Third, ICBMs “complicate” Russian targeting choices because any first strike would presumably have to eliminate all U.S. ICBMs. But a strike that large would certainly provoke U.S. retaliation. Russia is thus deterred because it can’t achieve its objectives with a smaller strike and because a bigger one would lead to massive retaliation. We challenge these arguments by simulating nuclear exchanges involving a U.S. arsenal with and without ICBMs. Using Nuclear War Simulator, a software tool created by Ivan Stepanov, we analyze the casualties and targeting limitations of U.S. first and retaliatory strikes under conditions of normal as well as generated alert levels. By comparing casualties and target coverage, we call into question claims that deterrence requires a triad to be robust.
About the speakers:
Moritz Kütt is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Peace and Security Research (IFSH) in Hamburg, Germany. He was a Postdoctoral Research Associate with SGS until Fall 2019. He received his PhD in physics from the Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany.
Ivan Stepanov is a simulation engineer based in Germany and the developer of The Nuclear War Simulator. He has a PhD in experimental physics from RWTH Aachen University, in Germany working with lasers, semiconductors and high-frequency electronics.
Sharon K. Weiner is Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at American University in Washington DC, and a visiting researcher at SGS. She has worked in both houses of Congress, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, and the White House Office of Management and Budget. She holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT.