A wargame at the US Naval War College in 1958, using the newly installed Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator. Credit: US Naval War College.
A wargame at the US Naval War College in 1958, using the newly installed Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator. Credit: US Naval War College.

The virtual seminar will be held from 12:30 to 2:00 p.m. (E.T.) 

In recent years, there has been concern among U.S. officials that adversaries might resort to limited nuclear weapon use in wartime to counter U.S. military power. This raises questions about how the U.S. should respond to such a potential threat of limited nuclear weapon use, and the coercive utility of the threat and use of conventional weapons versus nuclear weapons in deterring an adversary from making this threat. This talk explores the case of a possible U.S. effort to counter North Korea threats of limited nuclear weapon use during a war on the Korea peninsula to assess why U.S. officials may under some circumstances forgo available nuclear weapon use options and instead turn to conventional weapons. It is based on a series of 20 scenario-based interviews with former senior U.S. civilian and military officials to understand the United States’ options for conventional military deterrence of limited nuclear weapon use. It is based on a paper published in 2025.

 

About the speaker: Adam Mount is an independent scholar who has studied U.S. nuclear strategy, conventional deterrence, and progressive foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists and the Center for American Progress, as well as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.