The virtual seminar will be held from 12:30 to 2:00 p.m. (E.T.)
In the event that an incoming nuclear strike is detected, the US president will be presented with options for launching U.S. nuclear weapons in response. Although the president can always choose not to retaliate by waiting until confirmation of detonation on U.S. soil to act, does explicitly adding that as an option increase the likelihood the president will choose to ride out the attack before responding? Using a survey experiment, we show that decisions about how to respond in such a crisis are highly sensitive to the available options -- that is the choice set. Offering “no launch” as an option, in addition to multiple different options for nuclear retaliation, significantly reduced support for nuclear retaliation and especially among participants who focused on the human impact of their decision, as opposed to military strategy.
About the speaker: Sharon K. Weiner is associate professor of international relations at American University and a visiting researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security. Sharon's research, teaching, and policy engagement are at the intersection of organizational politics and U.S. national security. Her current work focuses on the theory, practice, and bureaucratic construction of deterrence as well as the psychology of nuclear decision making. Her most recent book, Managing the Military: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Civil-Military Relations (Columbia University Press, 2022) analyzes the power of the JCS chairman to help or hinder the president's ability to implement their defense policy. Sharon has previously worked on nuclear issues in both houses of Congress, the White House Office of Management and Budget, and the Joint Staff.