







NUKLEARE ARCHÄOLOGIE


ODER: WIE FORSCHUNGSREAKTOREN ZUR NUKLEAREN ABRÜSTUNG BEITRAGEN KÖNNEN

Alex Glaser

Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Einstein Center Digital Future, Berlin


Helmholtz Zentrum Berlin, 17. November 2022

BACKERCOUND



PROGRESS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT HAS BEEN REAL

(BUT IT HAS SLOWED DOWN SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE PAST DECADE)



Based on the Nuclear Notebook, maintained by Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, <u>thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/</u>

"THE GRAND BARGAIN"

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT & PEACEFUL USE

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (1970)



Existing nuclear weapon states agree not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other states

All other states agree to never acquire nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapon states (along with all others) undertake to pursue "good-faith negotiations" on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament

PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY & IAEA SAFEGUARDS



The NPT acknowledges the right of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes


Non-nuclear-weapon states accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards to ensure peaceful use

As of November 2022, the NPT has 191 states parties (5 weapon states, 186 non-weapon states)

Source: Zia Mian (August 2022)


There is enough nuclear explosive material worldwide to make over 200,000 nuclear weapons


1335 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)



ESTIMATING INVENTORIES CAN BE HARD

(AN EXAMPLE FROM THE 1996 U.S. PLUTONIUM DECLARATION)





Plutonium: The First 50 Years, DOE/DP-0137, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC, February 1996, www.ipfmlibrary.org/doe96.pdf



NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY

UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL HISTORY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Science & Global Security, 1993, Volume 3, pp.237-259 Photocopying permitted by license only Reprints available directly from the publisher © 1993 Gordon and Breach Science Publishers S.A. Printed in the United States of America

Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production

Steve Fettera

Controlling the production of fi tion policy. Similarly, accounti an important component of nuc techniques that make use of pl verify the past production of pl nique, the concentrations of lo reactor core are used to estima and thereby verify declaration technique, the ratio of the con determine whether a given enriched uranium, which is which can be used in nuclea "nuclear archaeology," in wh ties and thereby lay a firm fo

INTRODUCTION

For the first time, the tid tal proliferation—is ebb reduce their combined

ial element of nonprolifera-

Science & Global Security, 21:70-92, 2013 ISSN: 0892-9882 print / 1547-7800 online DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2013.755028

Applications and of Nuclear Arch in Uranium Enric

Matthew Sharp

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, DC, USA

The uranium-235 content of a uranium m-234 content of its waste, allowing Open-access articles are available at scienceandglobalsecurity org/archive decision in the content of its waste, or the turn of the waste, or the turn of the waste, or the turn of the content of its waste, or the turn of turn of the turn of turn of the turn of turn of the turn of the turn of t

Science & Global Security, 22:4-26, 2014 Copyright © Pacific Northwest National Laboratory ISSN: 0892-9882 print / 1547-7800 online DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2014.874217



The Future of Nuclear **Archaeology: Reducing Legacy Risks of Weapons** Fissile Material

Thomas W. Wood, Bruce D. Reid, Christopher M. Toomey, Kannan Krishnaswami, Kimberly A. Burns, Larry O. Casazza, Don S. Daly, and Leesa L. Duckworth

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, USA

This report describes the value proposition for a "nuclear archaeological" technical capability and applications program, targeted at resolving uncertainties regarding weapons fissile materials production and use. Central to this proposition is the notion that one can never be sure that all fissile material is adequately secure without a clear idea of what "all" means, and that uncertainty in this matter carries risk. We argue that this proposition is as valid today, under emerging state and possible nonstate nuclear threats, as it was in an immediate post-Cold-War context, and describe how nuclear archaeological methods can be used to verify fissile materials declarations, or estimate and characterize historical fissile materials production independent of dec-

larations. Methods for accurately estimating plutonium production from graphite reactors have been demonstrated and could be extended to other reactor types. Proposed

Security, 19:223-233, 2011 r & Francis Group, LLC int / 1547-7800 online 9882.2011.616124



ar Archaeology for y-Water-Moderated nium Production Reactors


r and Alexander Glaser

lechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University Engineer-

interest in a set of methods and tools that can be used to characmaterial production activities, using measurements and sampling at torage sites. This field has been dubbed "nuclear archaeology." The xample of nuclear archaeology relies on measurements of the isotope elements in the graphite of graphite-moderated plutonium produc-Graphite Isotope-Ratio Method (GIRM) determines the cumulative rough the graphite and thereby estimates the cumulative plutonium eactor. The great limitation of this particular method is that it can graphite-moderated reactors, which represent only one class of reeen used for unsafeguarded plutonium production. In this article, nd this method to non-graphite moderated reactors by analyzing evant isotope ratios in the support structures and other core comater moderated reactors. We present results of neutronics calculaneavy-moderated reactor evaluating the robustness of the method e of nuclear archaeology for applications in arms-control treaty

NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY

DOCUMENTING THE PAST TO ENABLE A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE FUTURE



THE CHALLENGE

Future progress toward verified nuclear disarmament will require a much better understanding of the stockpile of fissile materials that have been produced in unsafeguarded facilities; "nuclear archaeology" seeks to provide the tools to do so



THE IDEA

Develop of a framework that can provide a basis for preserving the history of relevant nuclear facilities; examine, in particular, the potential role of operating records to do so

Such a framework would complement other nuclear archaeology techniques, which rely on physical samples taken from structural components or waste materials for forensic analysis to draw conclusions about past activities

Source: IAEA (top), asian-defence-news.blogspot.com (bottom)

WHY CECMANY

(and/or other non-nuclear-weapon states)

ONGOING VERIFICATION INITIATIVES

(AS OF 2022, ALL WITH GERMAN PARTICIPATION)

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION



Established in 2015; currently 29 participating countries


IPNDV seeks to identify challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification and to develop potential procedures and technologies to address those challenges

Phase III began in Spring/Summer 2021

Germany is co-chairing two (out of three) working groups

www.ipndv.org

GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION



Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) considers "the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament"

Established by the UN Secretary General following a resolution of the UN General Assembly (A/RES/71/67, Dec. 2016), the first GGE delivered its final report in May 2019 (A/71/67)

The second GGE has been convening in Geneva since 2021 25 members, including Germany

Source: <u>ipndv.org</u> Source: <u>www.flickr.com/photos/gruban/336920038</u>

SAMPLE-BASED NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY

(A possible use case)

NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY COULD BE USED TO VERIFY A NORTH KOREAN PLUTONIUM DECLARATION




Sampling position [cm]

Credit: CNN/Brian Rokus, 2008

Unit cell of the North Korea's Yongbyon reactor


GRAPHITE ISOTOPE RATIO METHOD (GIRM)



Based on data from Jungmin Kang, "Using the GIRM to Verify the DPRK's Plutonium-Production Declaration," Science & Global Security, 19 (2), 2011


DOCUMENT-BASED NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY

(A first case study)






OPENMC/ONIX MODEL OF JEEP II




Paul K. Romano et al., "OpenMC: A State-of-the-Art Monte Carlo Code for Research and Development," *Annals of Nuclear Energy,* 82, 2015
Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin, Moritz Kütt, and Alexander Glaser, "ONIX: An Open-source Depletion Code," *Annals of Nuclear Energy,* 151, 2021




RECONCILING ANALOG AND DIGITAL RECORDS

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2010




DETERMINING A CAPACITY FACTOR

FROM DIGITAL DATA AVAILABLE IN THE ARCHIVE



(30240 entries for one week of operation; one entry every 20 seconds)

TEST BEDS FOR NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY



Ågesta Reactor, Sweden




NRX, Canada




G2/G3, France

A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EFFORT

HOW TO CURATE AND PRESERVE ANALOG & DIGITAL DATA HOW TO CONFIRM INTEGRITY, AUTHENTICITY, AND PROVENANCE OF RECORDS






Source: asian-defence-news.blogspot.com

DEVELOPING A FIRST SET OF GUIDELINES

FOR DOCUMENT-BASED ARCHAEOLOGY



ANALOG RECORDS

Analog records can survive for decades, but require significant amounts of storage space

- Assess each type of a record's suitability for digitization
- Determine what properties of the physical records should be preserved in the digital surrogates
- Seek non-destructive digitization of logbooks and other physical records



DIGITAL OBJECTS

Digital records are more difficult to maintain than their analog counterparts

Requires decisions about file formats, metadata standards, and data management systems

Storage in repository that follows the Open Archival Information System (OAIS, <u>www.oais.info</u>) reference model and meets the criteria of established repository certification systems

Ole Reistad, Rebecca D. Frank, Alex Glaser, and Sindre H. Kaald, Document-based Nuclear Archaeology, Science & Global Security, 30 (2), 2022

CONCLUSION & WAY FORWARD



DEVELOP BEST PRACTICES FOR DOCUMENTING AND ARCHIVAL

No systematic efforts currently exist to archive and preserve the historical records of nuclear facilities at a level required for potential nuclear archaeology applications

Develop recommendations for data collection and storage at operational <u>and</u> future plants

This is a time critical effort (as facilities are being demolished, records destroyed, and staff retires)



A TIME FOR ACTION

Lead by example with regard to openness and transparency

Document-based archaeology can help support ongoing or planned decommissioning efforts

JEEP II case study has provided first insights ... but other participants are urgently needed

Source: <u>www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank</u> (top) and IFE (bottom)

SCIENCE & GLOBAL SECURITY

RINCETON UNIVERSITY

